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Defendants/appellants Michael Carey ("Michael") and Wendy Carey C'Wendy")
(together, "the Careys") submit the following Brief of the Appellant. 1

I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Careys have appealed from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration
as authorized by Utah Code Ann. §78B-l l-129(l)(a). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j).
II. STA TEMENT OF ISSUES
This appeal presents the following issues for review (see R. 361-378 (preserving
in the trial court)):

•

(1) Whether the claims brought by plaintiff/respondent Joseph Edwards
("Edwards") belong to Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. ("Seirus") and thus should be
brought by Edwards (if at all) derivatively;

•

(2) Whether the disputes raised in the first amended complaint in this action relate
to the Careys' performance of their duties as officers/employees of Seirus and thus are
subject to the broad arbitration agreements contained in Michael's and Wendy's written
employment agreements;
(3) Whether the trial court erred in denying the Careys' motion to compel

•

arbitration and to stay the pending action pending arbitration .

1

Because Michael and Wendy Carey have the same last name, this brief refers to them
by their first names when necessary for clarity.
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Whether a trial court correctly decided a motion to compel arbitration is an issue
of law which the appellate court reviews for correctness, according no deference to the
trial judge. Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah
1986). It is the policy of the Utah Supreme Court "to interpret arbitration clauses in a
manner that favors arbitration." Id.

III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This appeal is based on the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., which is
set forth verbatim in the Appendix to this brief.
IV. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE
Edwards filed his complaint against the Careys and Seirus in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County on July 29, 2015. (R. 1-12.) Five days later,

•

Edwards filed a motion for temporary restraining order, which the court denied on
August 7, 2015. (R. 25-27; 304-305.) Edwards filed a first amended complaint on
August 21, 2015. (R. 310-326.)
Thereafter, on September 21, 2015, the Careys moved the trial court to compel
arbitration and stay proceedings pending arbitration. (R. 331-333; 361-379.) The court
issued its memorandum decision denying the motion to compel arbitration on
December 11, 2015. (R. 567-571.) The Careys timely appealed on December 28, 2015.
(R. 572-574.) After appealing, the Careys filed a motion in the trial court to stay
proceedings pending the appeal, which the court denied. (R. 603-614.)

2
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•

V. SUMMARY OF FACTS
Because some of the issues on appeal involve the nature of the claims brought by
Edwards and the history of the relationship between the parties, a more thorough review
of the facts underlying the litigation is set forth below.

A.

Seirus Is Formed
In 1985, Michael and Edwards incorporated a company under the laws of Utah,

dedicated to engineering, licensing, and developing cutting edge products for winter
sport, outdoor activity, tactical, hunting, workwear, and cold weather activity markets.

(R. 382 ~ 4; 384 ~ 9.) The company, named Seirus, does business throughout the United
States and also internationally, with registered trademarks in both. (R. 386 ~ 13; 312
~

11.)
At the time of incorporation, Michael and Edwards each owned 50% of Seirus'

stock. (See R. 311

~

9.) Currently, Michael owns 55.44% and Edwards owns 44.56% of

the company's stock. (R.382-3831~ 2, 6.) Michael, Edwards, and Wendy (Michael's
wife) have always been the only three directors on the Seirus Board of Directors. (R. 383

,I 6.)
B.

The Duties of Seirus' Officers
Seirus' Bylaws govern the company's decision-making process and specify the

powers of the Board. (R.384-3851 10.) The Bylaws also establish the company's
officer positions and their roles within the company. For example:
•

Article IV, Section 6, subsection (a) states that the "president shall, subject
to the direction and supervision of the board of directors, (i) be the chief
executive officer of the corporation and have general and active control of

3
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its affairs and business and general supervision of its officers, agents and
employees; (ii) unless there is a chairman of the board, preside at all
meetings of the shareholders and board of directors; (iii) see that all orders
and resolutions of the board of directors are carried into effect; and
(iv) perform all other duties incident to the office of the president and as
from time to time may be assigned to him by the board of directors." (R.
410-411.)
•

Article IV, Section 6, subsection (b) provides the vice-president role is
optional. (R. 411.)

•

Article IV, Section 6, subsections (c) and (d) define the duties of the
secretary and treasurer to include keeping the company's records and
minutes, providing stockholder notices, updating and safekeeping the
company's stock ledger, and handling the company's accounts and
finances. (R. 411-412.)

Currently, Michael is the company's president and chief executive officer, and
Wendy is its secretary, treasurer and chief financial officer. (R. 382 ilil 2, 5.) Consistent
with the business of the company, Michael's and Wendy's officer positions require them
to engage in interstate commerce. (R. 386 il 13; 464 il 5.)

C.

Seirus' Employees
Although the company was incorporated in Utah, Seirus is based in San Diego,

California and its only offices are there. (R. 382 il 3.) Its 60 employees also all work in
San Diego at the company offices. Id.
Michael is employed full-time in the San Diego office and is primarily responsible
for the company's day-to-day operations. (R. 382 il 2.) Wendy also is employed fulltime in the San Diego office and is responsible for managing the company's finances,
including its accounts and funds, receiving payment for amounts owed to the company,
and keeping accurate financial and accounting records for the company. (R. 382-383

4
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1 5.)

Wendy also assists in managing various departments of Seirus, and manages the IT

department in particular. Id.
Edwards, on the other hand, lives in Utah and has never worked full-time for
Seirus. (R.38317.) In 1987 and again in 1993, responsibility for the limited areas of
the company that Edwards had managed for a few years (sales, some production) was
transferred to Michael in San Diego. Id. Although Edwards began working an average
of 10 hours a week in San Diego starting in 2000, he has not managed any employees for
over a decade. Id. During that time, he was responsible only for overseeing company
legal affairs, public relations, advertising, and executive searches. Id. By the summer of
2015, Edwards had stopped working out of the San Diego office and was no longer doing
any significant amount of work for the company. Id.

D.

Edwards Is Terminated as an Officer
Over the last few years, Michael observed how Edwards put his own interests

ahead of those of the company. (R. 387114.) For example, between 2004 and 2012
Michael loaned Seirus $4,745,092 and Edwards loaned the company $3,020,606, at
interest rates between 4.25% and 10%. (R. 387 ~ 15.) When on October 2, 2013 the
company's lender required Michael and Edwards to suspend payment of interest and
principal on their insider loans, they agreed to do so. (R. 387116.) After the lender
removed its restrictions on April 7, 2014, Michael believed it was in the best interests of
Seirus to permanently reduce the interest rate on the shareholder promissory notes to
4.25% and he asked Edwards multiple times to do so. (R. 3871 17.) Putting his own
interests ahead of those of the company, Edwards continually rebuffed Michael's
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•
suggestions to even meet to discuss the matter, and he continues to insist on personally
receiving an above-market interest rate from the company. Id.
At Seirus' annual shareholder meeting on May 20, 2015, Edwards attempted to
vote himself as the sole director of the Board. (R. 3 88 ,I 19.) Michael blocked his
attempt. Id. However, because both Michael and Edwards were 50% shareholders at the
time, their deadlock prevented them from electing any new members to the Board. Id.
Two months later, on July 10, 2015, Edwards sued Seirus to recover interest
allegedly due under his notes with the company. (R. 388 ,I 18 [Joseph H. Edwards v.
Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., Third Judicial District Court for Sale Lake County,

State of Utah, Case No. 150904602].) In his business judgment as president and CEO,

•

Michael determined that Edwards was no longer capable of neutrally serving as an officer
of Seirus and that it was time to take action to protect the company's business. (R. 388

•

11 18, 20.)
On July 27, 2015, the Board held a special meeting to address the company's
deadlock and other pressing issues affecting Seirus' business. (R.3891121, 22.) As
president and CEO, Michael recommended that the Board remove Edwards from his
position as an officer of Seirus, appoint Wendy as the company's secretary and treasurer,
authorize a company project involving the licensing of Seirus' technology, and authorize
a debt for equity exchange between the company and its stockholders. (R. 389 ,I 22.)
Michael recommended that the Board remove Edwards as an officer for three primary
reasons: (1) Edwards could no longer faithfully serve Seirus while at the same time sue
the company to recover excessive, above-market interest purportedly owed to him by
6
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•

Seirus; (2) Edwards engaged in fraudulent activity detrimental to the company as detailed
in the minutes; and (3) Edwards engaged in many instances of gross mismanagement and
usurped corporate opportunities contrary to the interests of the company. (R. 389 ,r 23.)
The Board approved and adopted all of Michael's recommendations and Edwards was no
longer an officer of the company, although he retained his position on the Board. (R. 389

,r 22; 43~56.)
E.

The Board Also Approved an Equity Exchange Offering
At the July 27, 2015 Board meeting, the Board also voted to approve an Equity

Exchange Offering as being in the best interests of the Company. (R. 390 ,r 25.) At that
time, Seirus owed over $6.8 million to its shareholders. Id. As CEO, it was Michael's
recommendation that an equity exchange would allow Seirus to capitalize itself without
having to raise funds to repay the debt, increasing cash flow, decreasing expenses and
increasing profits by eliminating its interest payments. Id. Reducing the debt had a
number of other anticipated benefits, including: (I) providing the company greater
flexibility in its financing options and securing its relationship with its lender for a
smooth loan renewal anticipated in August 2015 with more favorable covenants;
(2) providing more flexibility and liquidity in dealing with on-going, high-exposure

•

patent litigation with Columbia Sports, a billion dollar opponent; (3) protecting against
shareholder unrest; (4) preventing self-interested shareholder actions seeking collection
and/or enforcement of the debt, such as the action Edwards initiated against the company.

Id. In Michael's business judgment, the Equity Exchange Offering would increase the
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•
value of the company to the benefit of both shareholders. Id. Both shareholders were
equally able to choose whether to participate in the Equity Exchange Offering.
Three days after the Board approved the Equity Exchange Offering, Michael
elected to cancel $3,782,960.92 of principal debt Seirus owed to him in exchange for
152.54 shares of the Company (at $24,800.00 per share). (R. 390 ,r 26.) Though he
could have done so, Edwards chose not to elect to convert any of his debt into company
equity. Id. As a result, Michael currently owns 55.44% of the company's stock and

•

Edward owns the remaining 44.56%. Id.

F.

Edwards Files This Lawsuit, His Second Against the Company
Edwards filed this lawsuit against the Careys and Seirus, on July 29, 2015, two

days after the July 27 Board meeting. (R. 1-10.) His complaint contained causes of
action for conflict of interest transactions, breach of fiduciary duty, removal of directors
pursuant to Utah Code § 16-1 0a-809, and request for declaratory judgment. Id. His
prayer for relief sought "an order fonn the Court declaring void ... : ( 1) the termination
of Edwards as an employee and officer of the company; and (2) the plan to convert
shareholder debt to additional shareholder equity (or any other stock issuances)",
damages, punitive damages, pre-judgment interest, "an order from the Court removing
Defendant Michael Carey and Defendant Wendy Carey as directors of the Company",
and "a declaration of rights" as set forth in the complaint. (R. 9-10.)
Edwards moved for a temporary restraining order less than a week after filing his
complaint. (R. 25-27.) In his motion, he asked the court to enter:

8
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•

•
1. An order prohibiting Seirus, Mike Carey and Wendy Carey from taking any
steps to implement the Equity Exchange Offering, or any other action that
would cause Edwards' ownership interest in Seirus to fall below fifty percent;
2. An order prohibiting Seirus, Mike Carey and Wendy Carey from tenninating
Edwards' authority as an officer of Seirus or from interfering with his
reasonable access to company property, including his corporate email; and
3. An order that actions taken by the Board of Directors require the unanimous
vote of all Board Members, including Edwards, pending the resolution of this
matter on the merits or further order of the Court.
(R. 27.) The trial court denied the motion on August 7, 2015. (R. 304-305.)
Edwards filed a first amended complaint on August 21, 2015, adding a claim for
deprivation of preemptive rights. (R. 310-324.) His prayer for relief essentially did not
change. (R. 323.)

G.

Michael and Wendy Move to Compel Arbitration
Defendants Michael and Wendy thereafter filed a motion to compel arbitration and

stay proceeding. (R. 331-332.) They argued Edwards' complaint asserts derivative
claims belonging to Seirus and accuses the Careys of misconduct arising, at least in part,
from their duties as employees. Id. Both Michael's and Wendy's employment
agreements with Seirus contain broad arbitration clauses that require any dispute between
them and Seirus to be arbitrated in San Diego, California by the American Arbitration
Association in compliance with its Commercial Rules of Arbitration. Id. The arbitration
agreements read, in relevant part, as follows:

12. ARBITRATION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF.
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (b) below, the Employer and
the Employee agree that any dispute or controversy arising out of or
relating to any interpretation, construction, perfonnance, or breach of this
Agreement shall be settled and decided by arbitration ...
9
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(R. 424 (Michael's agreement); 474 (Wendy's agreement).) Edwards' claims against the

Careys relate directly to the performance of their duties as officers and employees of
Seirus and therefore fall within the scope of the Careys' binding arbitration agreements
with Seirus. (See R. 332.) The Careys filed their motion to compel because Edwards had
not responded to the Careys' written request to arbitrate Edwards' claims in San Diego.
Id.

On December 11, 2015, the trial court denied the Careys' motion in a

•

Memorandum Decision. (R. 567-570.) The court indicated it must resolve two questions
to determine whether the arbitration provision applies: (I) whether the Careys' actions
come within the scope of the employment agreements, and (2) whether Edwards' claims
are derivative. (R. 569.) As to the first question, the court stated "[t]he Careys are
correct that because of the Company's management structure and their overlapping roles
as directors and officers, it may be difficult to precisely determine which hat they were
wearing at different times. It may even be the case that the Careys' work as corporate
officers led them to recommend and ultimately approve the proposed actions in
question." Id. Despite this ambiguity, the court sided with Edwards' argument that he
had alleged his claims "primarily" against the Careys for their actions as directors of
Seirus. (R. 569-570.) As a result, the court found the employment agreements do not
govern Edwards' claims, and thus never addressed whether Edwards' claims are
derivative. (R. 570.) The Careys appealed. (R. 572-573.)

10
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•

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Careys had valid arbitration agreements as part of their employment contracts
with Seirus that require arbitration of all claims arising from the performance of their
duties as employees of the company. The Careys' arbitration agreements are governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") because both Seirus and the Careys are engaged
in interstate commerce. The FAA' s purpose is to promote arbitration and to ensure that
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms. Utah law is in agreement,
resolving disputes as to whether the parties agreed to resolve their disputes through
arbitration or litigation in favor of encouraging arbitration.
Edwards' claims must be arbitrated under the Careys' arbitration agreements with
Seirus for two reasons. First, the claims Edwards raises in his complaint are not his own
direct claims but rather are derivative claims belonging to the company. Second, his
claims relate to allegedly wrongful actions taken by the Careys as part of their role as
officers of the company. Therefore, the claims in Edwards' complaint come within the
arbitration agreements in the Careys' employment contracts because they arise out of or
relate to the performance of the Careys' contracts. Where a valid arbitration agreement
exists that covers the dispute in question, the court must compel arbitration. See Rent-A-

Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67-68, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
The trial court, however, found the Careys' arbitration agreements did not apply
because it found Edwards' claims, based on how Edwards chose to frame them in the
complaint, are "primarily" asserted against the Careys for actions they took as directors
of the company and not as officers. (R. 569-570.) Because of that finding, the court
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never addressed the second issue - whether Edwards' claims are derivative or direct in
nature. (R. 570.) The trial court erred in finding the arbitration agreement does not
apply. Its order denying the Careys' motion to compel arbitration should be reversed and
the matter should be ordered to arbitration. Further, the trial court action should be
stayed pending completion of the arbitration.
VII. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

The Careys' Arbitration Agreements Are Governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act
As a fundamental matter, the Careys' arbitration agreements are governed by the

FAA, which applies to all arbitration agreements "evidencing a transaction involving
commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74,
115 S. Ct. 834 ( 1995). "Employment contracts, except for those covering workers
engaged in transportation, are covered by the FAA." E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534
U.S. 279, 289, 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002) (internal citations omitted); see also Int'! Bhd. of

Elec. Workers, Local 111 v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado, 773 F.3d 1100, 1106 (10th Cir.
2014) (same). "Agreements to arbitrate that fall within the scope and coverage of the
[FAA] ... must be enforced in state and federal courts." KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, _ U.S.
_, 132 S. Ct. 23, 24(2011) (emphasis added).
Seirus engages in interstate commerce. Its business extends throughout the United
States and internationally. (R. 312 ~ 11.) As a result, the Careys' management of Seirus'
business also heavily involves interstate commerce. For example, as the company's
president and CEO, Michael regularly travels outside of California to attend to Seirus'
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•

business. (R.3861 13.) He also represents Seirus at national tradeshows and has
directed promotion of Seirus' products in media outlets located in California, Utah,
Denver, Washington, and New York, among others. Id. Wendy's activities as the
secretary, treasurer, and CFO of Seirus also involve interstate commerce. (R.46415.)
As an officer of Seirus, Wendy has attended tradeshows in Nevada, Utah, and Colorado,
among other U.S. states. Id. Moreover, as the company's secretary, Wendy regularly
sends stockholder notices to (and otherwise communicates with) Edwards across state
lines. Id. Further, even the alleged wrongful acts Edwards alleges in his complaint that
the Careys carried out took place across state lines.
There is no dispute that the Careys' employment with Seirus affects interstate
commerce. The arbitration clauses in the Careys' employment agreements, therefore, are
governed by the FAA.

B.

Both Federal and Utah Law Strongly Favor Arbitration as a Method of
Dispute Resolution
The FAA expresses a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. AT&T Mobility

LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345-46, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (citing Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 540,443, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006)). The

"overarching purpose of the FAA" is to promote arbitration and "ensure the enforcement

•

of arbitration agreements according to their terms." See AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 344.
"[A ]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration ...." Moses H. Cone Mem'I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co,p., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25,
103 S. Ct. 927 (1983).
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•
The FAA "leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a ... court but instead
mandates that courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which

•

an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213,218, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985). "State and federal courts must examine with care the
complaints seeking to invoke their jurisdiction in order to separate arbitrable from

•

nonarbitrable claims. A court may not issue a blanket refusal to compel arbitration
merely on the grounds that some of the claims could be resolved by the court without

•

arbitration." KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, supra, 132 S. Ct. at 24. The court must compel
arbitration where a valid arbitration agreement exists that covers the dispute in question.
See Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S at 67-68.

•

In accord with the FAA, Utah law also recognizes a strong presumption in favor of
arbitration. Mariposa Exp., Inc. v. United Shipping Solutions, LLC, 2013 UT App 28, ,,
16-17, 295 P.3d 1173 (Utah has a "policy favoring arbitration"). The Court of Appeals

•

has stated: "[I]f there is any question as to whether the parties agreed to resolve their
disputes through arbitration or litigation, ... we interpret the agreement keeping in mind
our policy of encouraging arbitration. It is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret

•

contracts in favor of arbitration, in keeping with [Utah's] policy of encouraging
extrajudicial resolution of disputes when the parties have agreed not to litigate." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
C.

Edwards' Claims Are Derivative on Behalf of Seirus

It is true that the Careys' arbitration agreements are with the company, and not
with Edwards. But that fact doesn't preclude the arbitration agreements from applying to
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Edwards' claims because his claims are properly characterized as derivative claims of the
corporation. Therefore, the claims are arbitrable even though the arbitration agreement is
with the company and not Edwards.
Derivative suits "are those which seek to enforce any right which belongs to the
corporation." Richardson v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980). "Actions
alleging mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, and appropriation or waste of
corporate opportunities and assets generally belong to the corporation, and therefore, a
shareholder must bring such actions on its behalf." Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v.

Liberty West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 1998).
Under limited circumstances, a minority stockholder in a closely held corporation
may sue individually where he or she can show "an injury to him- or herself that is
distinct from that suffered by the corporation." Id. Where, however, a stockholder
"seeks by its pleading to enforce a right of the corporation," the stockholder must proceed
derivatively. See Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ,I 22,216 P.3d 944
(finding that dissenting stockholder had derivative standing as a class of one); Warner v.

DMG Color, 2000 UT 102, ,I 15, 20 P.3d 868 (holding, in the context of a closely held
corporation, that minority stockholder's claims for conversion and misappropriation were
derivative because they "stem solely from his status as a corporate shareholder-the mark
of a derivative claim"). To determine whether claims are derivative or direct, the Court
looks at the nature of the stockholder's claims and not their labels. See Warner, 2000 UT
102,,I 19.
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Under these rules, Edwards' claims are derivative. Edwards contends the Careys
have a conflict of interests and have breached their fiduciary duties by "(a) the
tennination of [Plaintiff] as an officer and employee of the Company; and (b) the
approval of the conversion of shareholder debt to shareholder equity program or the
issuance of any other equity to alter the 50-50 ownership structure." (R. 319-320 ,r,r 4452.) The complaint frames the alleged resulting harm in terms of harm to the company
and not Edwards individually. For example, Edwards claims the Careys "have used the
Company for their personal advantage rather than for the benefit of all shareholders, as
required by statute/law, including engaging in unauthorized actions and self-dealing that
placed their interests above the Company's interests." (R. 312 ,r 14.) Edwards also
accuses the Careys of corporate waste and mismanagement because they have allegedly
not "act[ed] in the best interests of the Company ... [by failing to conduct] an
independent review of executive compensation to ensure the Company was not over-

•

paying for executive services." (R. 316-317131.)
Consistent with the derivative nature of his claims, Edwards' complaint does not
seek to vindicate any personal rights he may have against the Careys or Seirus. See, e.g.,
Utah Code Ann. § 16-1 0a-622(3) (Shareholders of closely held corporations have "no
fiduciary duty or other similar duty to any other shareholder of the corporation, including
not having a duty of care, loyalty, or utmost good faith"). For example, Edwards does
not (and cannot) allege that he had a personal contractual right to continue his
employment at Seirus. (See R. 386 ,r 12; 430--434.) To the contrary, Edwards complains
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•

that his termination as an employee of Seirus was not "in the best interest of the
Company." (R. 313 il 17.)
Edwards signed the Careys' employment agreements containing the arbitration
agreements on behalf of the company, and the agreements are binding on Edwards in his
role as a shareholder bringing a derivative action against the Careys. See, e.g., Frederick

v. First Union Securities, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th 694, 697-698 (2002) (A corporation's
agreement with a third party to arbitrate disputes is binding on a shareholder bringing a
derivative action against that party); Bass v. SMG, Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d 492, 505-507
(2002) (compelling arbitration of derivative claims even though the representative
plaintiff did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration clause). Thus, if Seirus
would be required to arbitrate, Edward is similarly bound to arbitrate his claims. Claus v.

Paychex, Inc., No. 0045296, 2012 WL 1669425, *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2012)
(finding plaintiff was required to arbitrate where claims were derivative of corporation
bound to arbitrate). As shown below, had Edwards' claims been brought directly by
Seirus, the company would be required to arbitrate those claims. Accordingly, Edwards
should be compelled to arbitrate the derivative claims, as well.

D.

Edwards' Claims Must Be Arbitrated Because They Arise Out of the Careys'
Employment Contracts Which Contain the Binding Arbitration Provisions
In light of the strong federal and state policies favoring arbitration, where there is

a valid agreement to arbitrate, so long as the dispute falls within the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate it must be arbitrated. See Mitsubishi Motors C01p. v. Soler

Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 4 73 U.S. 614, 626, I 05 S. Ct. 3346 ( 1986) ("[T]he first task of a
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court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate that dispute.").
Here, there is a valid agreement between Seirus (and, therefore, any stockholder
such as Edwards representing Seirus in a derivative claim) and the Careys to arbitrate all
disputes arising from the Careys' performance of their duties as officers of the company Michael as president and CEO and Wendy as secretary, treasurer and CFO. The binding
arbitration clauses in both of the Careys' employment agreements state that:
[Seirus] and the Employee agree that any dispute or controversy arising out
of or relating to any interpretation, construction, performance, or breach of
this Agreement shall be settled and decided by arbitration conducted by the
American Arbitration Association in accordance with the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, as then in
effect[.]
(R.424112; 474, 14.)
This is the essence of a broad arbitration clause. See, e.g., Brown v. Coleman Co.,
220 F .3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that an arbitration clause stating "all
disputes or controversies arising under or in connection with this Agreement ... will be
settled exclusively by arbitration" was "the very definition of a broad arbitration clause"
(omission in original)); Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc.,
252 F.3d 218, 225-27 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that phrase "[a]ny dispute arising from the
making, performance or termination of this [agreement]," while containing limiting
language, was "a broad arbitration clause"). The Careys' employment agreements
contain valid and broad agreements to arbitrate.
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The allegations in Edwards' first amended complaint and the evidentiary facts in
defense of those allegations fall squarely within the scope of this broad arbitration clause
and thus must be arbitrated. Edwards' claims all "arise out of' the Careys'
"performance" as employees and officers of Seirus. If there is any uncertainty or
ambiguity as to whether the claims come within the arbitration agreement, they still must
be arbitrated. See Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm., 72 F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1995)
("[T]o acknowledge the ambiguity is to resolve the issue, because all ambiguities must be
resolved in favor of arbitrability") (emphasis in original).
Arbitrability turns on the underlying facts of a dispute, not on the legal theories a
party advances based on those facts or the label he places on his claims. Oldroyd v.

Elmira Sav. Bank FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1998) (Courts must focus on factual
allegations in a complaint rather than on the legal causes of action asserted in determining
whether a particular claim falls within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement). In
his causes of action for conflict of interests, breach of fiduciary duty, removal of director,
and declaratory relief, Edwards accuses Michael of wrongfully "ousting Edwards as an
officer of the Company." (See R. 313-322 ilil 17, 43-45, 49, 53-54, 63, 65.) The
evidentiary facts in defense of these claims show that the company's CEO and president,
Michael was empowered with managerial discretion to control and supervise the
company's "officers, agents, and employees." (R. 382 il 2; 411.) Michael decided to
recommend that Seirus tenninate Edwards as an officer only after repeatedly observing
that Edwards put his own self-interests ahead of the interests of the company. (R. 387389

ilil 14-23.)

Edwards' claims must be arbitrated because they concern his
19
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termination, which "arises out of' Michael's "performance" of his duties as president and
CEO of Seirus.
Similarly, the causes of action in Edwards' first amended complaint arise from the
Careys' business decision to recommend and implement the Equity Exchange Offering.
(See R.319-3221141-42, 44-45, 49, 53-54, 58, 61, 63, 65.) In broad strokes, Edwards

alleges that "Michael and his spouse, Wendy Carey, have used the Company for their
personal advantage rather than for the benefit of all shareholders." (R.312114.) With
respect to the Equity Exchange Offering, Edwards criticizes the Careys' business
judgment regarding the company's "need for any equity infusion." (R.314122.)
Edwards also objects to the manner in which the Careys structured, gave notice of, and
implemented the Equity Exchange Offering. (R.314-3181120-21, 32-37.)
Again, the Careys' efforts to develop and implement the Equity Exchange
Offering arise from the performance of their duties as officers of Seirus. For example, as
the company's CEO and President, it is Michael's responsibility to "have general and
active control of [the Company's] affairs and business." (R.384110; 411.) It was in
this capacity that Michael determined it was necessary for the company to retire its debts
to the stockholders. (See R. 390125.) Michael decided to recommend the Equity
Exchange Offering for sound business purposes, including improving the company's: (i)
financing options; (ii) profitability; and (iii) quelling shareholder unrest. Id.
Likewise, Wendy's position as secretary, treasurer, and CFO, required her to be
intimately involved in the details of the Equity Exchange Offering. As the company's
secretary, it was Wendy's responsibility to issue additional stock to any stockholder
20
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electing to participate in the Equity Exchange Offering. (R. 464-465, 116-7.) It was
also her responsibility to update and manage the company's stock ledger after Michael
elected to convert the entirety of the debt owed to him by the company into equity. Id.
Finally, as Seirus' CFO, Wendy has acted as the face of the company in its interactions
with its primary banker (Torrey Pines Bank), which approves of the company's decision
to retire a portion of the debt owed to Seirus' stockholders. (R. 464-465 1 6; 4 79.)
Edwards' remaining allegations concern decisions the Careys made regarding the
company's business strategies and the compensation of its employees. (See R. 316-317
1130-31.) As previously discussed, the management of the company and its employees
are also duties the Careys performed as officers of Seirus.
At a minimum, both Edwards' allegations and the evidentiary facts submitted in
support of the Careys' motion to compel arbitration raise an ambiguity as to whether
Edwards' claims "arise out of' the Careys' "performance" as employees and officers of
Seirus so that they come within the arbitration agreements. Even the trial court
acknowledged this ambiguity when it stated the "Careys are correct" that their roles as
officers overlapped with their roles as directors so that "it may be difficult to precisely
determine which hat they were wearing at different times." (R. 569.) Because of the
strong preference under the FAA and in Utah for arbitration, this uncertainty or
ambiguity as to whether Edwards' claims come within the arbitration agreement compels
the conclusion that Edwards' claims must be arbitrated. See Annijo, supra, 72 F.3d at
798 ("[T]o acknowledge the ambiguity is to resolve the issue, because all ambiguities
must be resolved in favor of arbitrability") ( emphasis in original). The trial court erred
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•
when it acknowledged the ambiguity but then chose to resolve it in favor of nonarbitrability, contrary to what the law requires.
The Careys' employment agreements govern their relationship with Seirus. The
Supreme Court instructs that arbitration must be ordered unless it can be said "with
positive assurance" that a dispute is not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

•

AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers ofAm., 475 U.S. 643,650, 106 S. Ct. 1415
(1986). Here, it cannot be said with positive assurance that Edwards' claims do not touch
on the arbitration provisions included in the Careys' employment agreements. This much
is clear: the Careys performed their duties as officers of Seirus pursuant to those
agreements. Therefore, Edwards' claims against the Careys must be arbitrated.

E.

The Court Should Order the Action Stayed Pending Arbitration
Both federal and Utah law empower courts to stay proceedings involving non-

arbitrable claims pending the completion of arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 3; Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-11-108(7). In fact, under the FAA, "[a] court must stay its proceedings if it
is satisfied that an issue before it is arbitrable ... " Shearson Am. Express, Inc. v.

McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,226, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (emphasis added); Coors Brewing
Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1514 (10th Cir. 1995) (The FAA requires that
courts stay "judicial proceedings where a written agreement provides for the arbitration
of the dispute that is the subject of the litigation"); see also Mariposa Exp., supra, 2013
UT App 28, ,I 19 (The Utah Arbitration Act requires that when a district court orders
arbitration the court should stay the underlying lawsuit).
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Along with reversing the order denying the Careys' motion to compel arbitration
and ordering the motion granted instead, the Court should the stay claims, if any, it deems
non-arbitrable. Because Edwards' claims against Careys involve a common set of facts,
they are all inextricably intertwined and the stay should extend to all non-arbitrable
claims. To the extent the Court decides that all claims are subject to arbitration, it may
either stay or dismiss this action.

VIII. CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the Court reverse the
trial court order denying their motion to compel arbitration, and on remand, order the trial
court to instead grant the motion and dismiss or stay the action until the arbitration is
resolved.
Dated: April 4th, 2016

•
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i)U.S.C. Title 9 - ARBITRATION

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg1USCODE-2014-title9/html/USCODE-20l ...

9 u.s.c.
United States Code, 2014 Edition
Title 9 - ARBITRATION
CHAPTER I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 2 - Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, \\'Ww.gpo.gov

§2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,
or the refusal to perfonn the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
(July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 670.)
DERIVATION

Act Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, §2, 43 Stat. 883 .

•
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11.. NOTICES. Any notices to be given hereunder by either party to the other
shall be in writing and may be transmitted by persona] delivery or by mail, registered or
certified, postage prepaid with return receipt requested. Notices delivered personally
shall be deemed communicated as of the date of the actual receipt; mailed notices shall be
deemed communicated as of three (3) days after mailing. Mailed notices shall be
addressed as follows:
(a)
In the case ofEmployer, 13975 Danielson Street, Poway, California 92064,
or to such other person or address as Employer may from time to time furnish to the other
parties to this Agreement.

(b) In the case of Employee, 6817 Elaine Way, San Diego, California, 92120 or
to such other person or address as Employee may from time to time furnish to the other
parties to this Agreement.
12.

ARBITRATION AND EOUITABLE RELIEF.

(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b) below, the Employer and Employee
agree that any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to any interpretation,
construction, perfonnance, or breach of this Agreement shall be settled and decided by
arbitration conducted by the American Arbitration Association in acpordance with the
Co.nunercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, as then in effect,
except as provided below. Any such arbitration shall be held and conducted in San Diego,
California, before one arbitrator who shall be selected by mutual agreement of the parties;
if agreement is not reached on the selection of an arbitrator within ten (10) days, then
such arbitrator shall be appointed by the presiding judge of San Diego Superior Court.
The provisions of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association shall apply and govern such arbitration, subject, however, to the following:
( i)

(ii)

(iii)

Any demand for arbitration shall be in writing and must be made
within a reasonable time after the claim, dispute or other matter in
question has arisen. In no event shall the demand for arbitration be
made after the date that institution of legal or equitable proceedings
based on such claim, dispute, or other matter would be barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
The arbitrator appointed must be a former or retired judge or an
attorney with at least ten ( 10) years experience in commercial
matters, or a non-attorney with like experience in the area of dispute.
The arbitrator shall prepare in writing and provide to the parties
factual findings and the reasons on which the decision of the
arbitrator is based.
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hereunder shall be preswned to relate to an Invention made during the term of
Employee's employment unless Employee can produce evidence to the contrary.
INDEMNIFICATION BY EMPLOYER. Employer shall, to the
maximum extent permitted by law, indemnify and hold Employee harmless against
12.

expenses~ including reasonable attorney's fees,judgments, fines, settlements, and other
amounts actually and reasonably incurred in connection with any proceeding arising as a
result of employment duties Employee performs for Employer in compliance with the
terms of this Agreement.

13. NOTICES. Any notices to be given hereunder by either party to the other
shall be in writing and may be transmitted by personal delivery or by mail, registered or
certified, postage prepaid with return receipt requested. Notices delivered personally
shall be deemed communicated as of the date of the actual receipt; mailed notices shall be
deemed communicated as of three (3) days after mailing. Mailed notices shall be
addressed as follows:
(a)
In the case of Employer, 13975 Danielson Street, Poway, California 92064,
or to such other person or address as Employer may from time to time furnish to the other
parties to this Agreement.

In the case of Employee, 6817 EJaine Way, San Diego, California:, 92120 or
(b)
to such other person or address as Employee may from time to time furnish to the other
parties to this Agreement.

14. ARBITRATION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF.
(a) Except as
provided in subparagraph (b) below, the Employer and Employee agree that any dispute
or controversy arising out of or relating to any interpretation, construction, performance,
or breach of this Agreement shall be settled and decided by arbitration conducted by the
American Arbitration Association in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association, as then in effect, except as provided below. Any
such arbitration shall be held and conducted in San Diego, California, before one
arbitrator who shall be selected by mutual agreement of the parties; if agreement is not
reached on the selection of an arbitrator within ten ( I 0) days, then such arbitrator shall be
appointed by the presiding judge of San Diego Superior Court.
The provisions of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association sha11 apply and govern such arbitration, subject, however, to the following:
(i)

Any demand for arbitration shall be in writing and must be made
-7-
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Joseph Edwards,
Plaintiff,

MemorandU111 Decision
v.

Michael Carey, Wendy Carey,
Seirus Innovative Acc. Inc.,

Case No. 150905215
Judge Marks. Kouris

Defendants.

In this action, Plaintiff Joseph Edwards asserts various
claims against Defendants Michael (Michael) and Wendy (Wendy)
Carey {collectively, the Careys), and Seirus Innovative
Acces-sories, Inc.

(the Company). The Careys now argue that all of

Edwards' claims against them must be arbitrated pursuant to an
arbitration provision in employment agreements that the Careys
signed with the Company.
BACKGROUND

Edwards and the Careys formed the Company several years ago,
with Michael and Edwards each owning 50 percent of the Company's
stock. Since the Company's formation, Edwards and the Careys have
served as the sole directors on the Company's board of directors.
Until recently, they also served as the Company's primary
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corporate officers, with Michael serving as CEO, Wendy serving as
COO, and Edwards serving as CFO. Then, at a board of directors
meeting, the Careys voted to remove Edwards as CFO and to trade
debt owed to Michael and Edwards for additional stock in the
Company (the debt-to-equity conversion). As a result of the debtto-equity conversion, Michael and Edwards now own unequal stock
in the Company: Michael is now the majority stockholder, as he
owns more than 50 percent of the stock in the Company, while
Edwards owns less than so percent of the Company's stock and is
the Company's minority shareholder.
Following those decisions, Edwards brought this action
against the Careys and the Company. In the Amended Complaint,
Edwards alleges that the Careys acted improperly when they
removed him as a corporate officer and forced him to trade debt
that the Company owed him for stock.
ANALYSIS

The Careys now assert that, pursuant to a mandatory
arbitration provision in employment agreements they signed with
the Company, all of Edwards' claims against them must be
arbitrated. In so asserting, the Careys acknowledge that the
agreements were between the Careys and the Company, and that
Edwards was not party to the employment agreements. However, the
Careys claim that the employment agreements nevertheless apply
because, in substance, Edwards' claims are actually derivative
claims brought on behalf of the Company. See Richardson v.
Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980) · (stating that

a derivative claim or suit "seek[s] to enforce any right which
belongs to the corporation" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In response, Edwards argues that the arbitration provision does
not apply for two reasons: First, because the Careys took the
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actions in question as directors and the employment agreements
only covered their activities as corporate officers and second,
because the claims are not derivative claims. Therefore, to
determine whether the arbitration provision applies, the Court
must resolve two questions: (1) Whether the Careys' actions are
within the scope of the employment agreements and (2) whether
Edwards' claims are derivative or direct in nature.
I.

Were the Carey's actions with the scope of the employment
agreements.

In opposing the motion to compel arbitration, Edwards argues
that his claims against the careys are for the actions they took
as directors, and therefore, the employment agreements do not
apply because the agreements only governed the actions taken by
the Careys as officers of the Company, and do not apply to their
actions as directors.

In their reply memorandum, the Careys concede that the
employment agreements only "govern the performance of their
duties as officers of [the Company]

.n

(Reply Mem. at iii.)

Nevertheless, the Careys maintain that the arbitration provision
applies in this case because all of the actions in question
"necessarily involve consideration of the Carey's conduct as
officers." (Id. at 4.) The Careys are correct that because of the
Company's management structure and their overlapping roles as
directors and officers, it may be difficult to precisely
determine which hat they were wearing at different times. It may
even be the case that the Careys' work as corporate officers led
them to recommend and ultimately approve the proposed actions in
question.
However, as Edwards notes, his claims against the Careys in
the Amended Complaint are primarily asserted against the Careys
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for actions they took as directors of the Company. For example,
the claims for conflict of interest and removal of directors
relate solely to the Careys' actions and roles as directors
rather than officers. Likewise, all of the other alleged actions
in question, such as the debt-to-equity conversion and
termination of Edwards' employment, were undertaken by the Careys

at a meeting of the board of directors, rather than as part of
their day-to-day activities as corporate officers. While the
J

•

Careys are correct that there may be some overlap between those
decisions and the Careys' performance of their duties as
corporate officers, the allegations of the Amended Complaint
clearly focus on the Careys' actions as directors of the Company,
and Edwards has affirmatively stated that he is only pursuing
claims against the Careys for their actions as directors.
Therefore, based on the record currently before the Court and the
Careys' concession that the employment agreements only cover
their work as officers, this Court concludes that in fact, the
employment agreements do not govern Edwards' claims in this case.
Because this Court concludes that the employment agreements
do not apply in this case, the question as to whether Edwards'
claims are derivative or direct in nature is not addressed.
·For these reasons, this Court DENIES the Careys' Motion to
Compel Arbitration.

•

DATED this ll t.h day of December 2015 .

the Tturt:

t~l6La..__,_,__-~
Marks. Kouris
District Court Judge
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